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Global capitalization of commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) today exceeds $500 billion, and CMBS have been included in 
several fixed-income indexes in the past several years. As the CMBS 
market continues to grow, understanding the risk characteristics of 
these investments becomes more important to a broader market of 
investors.  
To date, much of the research on commercial mortgages and 
CMBS has focused on the impact of default during the term of the loan 
(i.e., term default), and has paid little attention to balloon or extension 
risk. Lehman, Freydberg, and Tcherkassova note about balloon risk for 
2004 vintage CMBS investments:  
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While we admit we are at a loss for forecasting future 
extensions we think that investors, particularly those managing 
buy and hold portfolios, should at least consider the potential 
implications of loan extensions when determining relative value 
[2004, p. 2] (emphasis in original).  
 
The newness of the CMBS market and the changing attributes of 
CMBS mortgage pools make it difficult for researchers to address the 
issue of balloon risk empirically. First, to date few CMBS investments 
have gone through a complete ten-year hold-to-maturity investment 
cycle, and none has experienced an investment cycle in an increasing 
interest rate environment, thus greatly limiting the data available to 
test the impact of balloon risk on CMBS investments.  
Second, CMBS pools that have matured have different 
characteristics from more recent pools. For example, the average 
CMBS pool size for the 1987-1995 CMBS issuances was $144.0 million, 
different from the $1.1 billion average pool size in 2004; the average 
loan size in CMBS pools has grown from $5.4 million in 1997 to $11.0 
million in 2004; and the property type makeup of the pools has 
changed from heavily weighted toward multifamily mortgages to 
domination by office and retail mortgages.  
Additionally, several current market factors may contribute to 
balloon risk in current CMBS investment tranches. Low commercial 
mortgage interest rates (generally below 6.0%) and increases in 
property values over the past decade (with little if any appreciation in 
property income) imply a reasonable chance that interest rates will 
rise or property values will fall when commercial mortgages issued 
today mature in the coming decade, thus increasing the probability of 
balloon risk. That said, balloon risk today on loans issued in the mid-to 
late 1990s is likely to remain low as current low interest rates allow for 
generous debt service coverage and lower loan-to-value ratios on 
appreciated property values, permitting relatively easy refinancing.  
Another potential contributor to balloon risk for current-vintage 
CMBS pools is relatively low subordination levels. Pool subordination 
levels have fallen dramatically in recent years, with subordination 
rates for conduit fusion transactions cut in half across all tranche levels 
since 1998 (see Exhibit 1).  
Furthermore, the increasing number of interest only and 
partially interest-only loans in new CMBS issues may also cause higher 
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balloon risk. Before 2000, interest-only or partial interest-only CMBS 
loans were virtually non-existent, but in the fourth quarter of2004, 
50% of conduit CMBS loans were partial interest-only or full interest-
only loans (see Exhibit 2).  
While balloon risk in commercial mortgages may be a significant 
contributor to the overall risk of investing in commercial mortgage-
backed securities, to date little research has focused on its impact on 
CMBS pricing. There are two primary reasons for the limited balloon 
risk research. First, as discussed earlier, there are limited data on 
balloon risk. Second, it is difficult to model term default risk and 
balloon risk simultaneously and then measure the impact of these risks 
on CMBS investment tranches under changing market conditions.  
Our primary purpose is to investigate the impact of balloon risk 
on the pricing of multiclass commercial mortgage-backed securities 
investments.  
 
CMBS Pricing Model  
To determine the credit risk in CMBS investments, we apply a 
commercial mortgage whole-loan pricing model to a CMBS framework. 
Specifically, we complete a series of simulation analyses that measure 
the balloon risk premiums of various CMBS tranches under changing 
pool characteristics and market conditions, such as lower tranche 
subordination levels, higher mortgage interest rates, and interest-only 
loans.  
Our CMBS valuation model has two separate stages. In the first 
stage, a whole loan's cash flow stream is projected on the basis of 
borrower default behavior. Then after the cash flow streams for the 
individual whole mortgages are simulated, mortgage cash flows are 
combined across all loans in the pool and allocated among the various 
CMBS investment classes in the second stage.  
To estimate the whole-loan cash flows, we use our model in Tu 
and Eppli [2003], which has two key distinguishing features. First, it 
considers two triggers when simulating borrowers' default decision: a 
property cash flow trigger, and an asset value trigger. Second, it takes 
into account the possibility of mortgage extension or balloon risk.1 
These unique features of the model allow us to incorporate balloon risk 
into a CMBS framework and then assess its impact on various 
investment tranches. Appendix A describes the double-trigger default 
model in more detail.  
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In the second stage, individual mortgage cash flow streams are 
combined across all loans in the pool and allocated among the CMBS 
investment classes. The value of each CMBS tranche is then calculated 
as the present value of the cash flow stream on a risk-neutral basis.  
To complete the two-stage analysis, we use Monte Carlo 
simulation to derive the values and credit risk premiums for each 
CMBS tranche.2 Each simulation path has three state variables 
(interest rate, property value, and property cash flow) that are 
updated each month (see Appendix B). Using the monthly updated 
variables, the borrower makes a default decision based on the 
contemporaneous loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt service coverage 
ratio (DSC).3  
If default occurs, the loan is foreclosed and the property is sold. 
The sale price, net of transaction costs, is then included in the CMBS 
pooled cash flows. If default does not occur, the scheduled mortgage 
payment is made, and the default decision is considered for the next 
period under a set of updated state variables.  
If a borrower does not default during the loan term, we then 
examine whether the property can be refinanced at mortgage 
maturity. Using the contemporaneous property value, mortgage 
interest rate, property cash flow, and underwriting standards, we 
estimate the loan amount the borrower is able to refinance (i.e., the 
justified refinance loan amount). If the justified refinance loan amount 
is equal to or greater than the outstanding mortgage balance, the 
mortgage balloon amount is paid off; otherwise, one of three paths is 
followed: 1) the borrower will use other equity capital to pay off the 
loan; 2) the borrower will default; or 3) the borrower and the lender 
will negotiate an extension.  
If the loan is extended, we assume the borrower will continue to 
make periodic debt service payments and follow the same 
payment/default conditions during the term of the loan. At the end of 
each extended month, the mortgage may be paid off (if the justified 
refinance loan amount exceeds the loan balance); in default (if both 
default triggers are satisfied); or extended again (otherwise) based on 
the new market and property conditions. Additionally, it is assumed 
that the mortgage can be extended for up to two years, at which point 
the borrower will be forced to liquidate the property and terminate the 
mortgage if neither default nor payoff has occurred during the two-
year extension period.4  
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After the cash flow streams for the 50% N mortgages in the 
CMBS pool are simulated, the cash flows are combined and allocated 
among CMBS investment classes. While interest payments and 
principal repayments (including scheduled amortization and principal 
recovery when default occurs) are distributed top-down to CMBS 
tranches, lost interest and the reduction in face amount of the 
principal (due to the shortfall between loan balance and principal 
recovery) are allocated bottom-up.  
The cash flow for each CMBS tranche is calculated monthly, and 
the cash flow stream is discounted on a risk neutral basis to determine 
each tranche value. The credit risk premium of a CMBS tranche over 
the risk-free rate is then calculated based on the tranche value.  
 
Simulation Parameters  
We must now populate the CMBS pricing model with a set of 
parameters that reflect the behavior of the market participants. We 
consult a variety of academic journals, professional publications, and 
industry experts to select a set of reasonable and logical parameters.  
We begin the model parameterization by considering a CMBS 
pool consisting of10-year commercial mortgages with a 30-year 
amortization schedule. To isolate the impact of credit risk on mortgage 
pricing, we assume that the mortgages are non-callable.5 The two 
primary mortgage underwriting standards at loan origination and at 
loan refinancing are a 67% LTV and a 1.4 DSC.  
Most commercial mortgage underwriters require some level of 
cash reserves or escrows to dampen cash flow volatility created by 
capital improvements, tenant improvements, and other expected and 
unexpected cash flow variances.6 When a property's contemporaneous 
debt service coverage ratio slips below 1.0, the borrower can then 
avoid immediate default by funding the property cash flow shortfall 
with funds from a reserve account. We have no empirical data on how 
long a borrower is able to delay default through the use of a reserve 
account, so we present three models in the simulation analysis to 
illustrate the effects of including the cash flow default trigger on CMBS 
pricing.  
Model 1 is a single-trigger, asset value-only, default model. The 
other two models assume that the borrower has sufficient reserves to 
fund a one-month (Model 2) and three-month (Model 3) cumulative 
debt service shortfall in the previous 12-month period, where a one-
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month shortfall is equal to one month's debt service payment. Models 
2 and 3 are double-trigger default models that include a 
contemporaneous LTV trigger and a contemporaneous cash flow 
trigger that both must be met for the property to be in default.  
Once a property is in default, it is assumed that the average 
time to foreclosure is 12 months and that the property value recovery 
rate is 90% with a standard deviation of 5%, consistent with the 
commercial mortgage default update in Esaki and Goldman [2004]. 
Additionally, there is a carrying cost per month of0.5% of the loan 
balance. These foreclosure assumptions hold for both term default and 
extension default. For each parameterization, 10,000 Monte Carlo 
paths are generated to ensure sufficient convergence to the true 
tranche value.  
 
CMBS Pricing Results-Base Case  
In the base case analysis, CMBS subordination levels are 
averages for the 1998-2004 period.7 To isolate the impact of balloon 
risk on overall credit risk, we begin by presenting credit risk premiums 
without including the effects of loan extension in Exhibit 3. At the 
whole-loan level, the term default risk premiums are 81 basis points 
for the single-default trigger model (i.e., Model 1). Including a cash 
flow trigger in Models 2 and 3 reduces the risk premiums to 79 and 64 
basis points, respectively.  
An interesting finding in Exhibit 3 is that the addition of a 
property income default trigger reduces whole loan default risk 
premiums while increasing the default risk premium for the 
investment-grade tranches. Initially these results seem counter-
intuitive, i.e., that a whole loan with lower risk premiums has higher 
risk premiums for the investment-grade tranches. Yet after a closer 
look, these findings are reasonable and can be explained as follows.  
Under the Model 3 assumptions, weaker or underperforming 
loans are kept current using a cash flow reserve account, and without 
that reserve would otherwise have defaulted. By stringing along these 
weaker loans, the eventual default, when it does occur, has a 
significantly higher loss rate.8  
While the probability or frequency of default at the whole-loan 
level is reduced in Model 3 (as the financial condition of some of the 
properties will improve), the increase in loss severity for the loans that 
default increases the risk of the investment-grade tranches. The non-
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2005): pg. 114-123. DOI. This article is © Institutional 
Investor, Inc. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional 
Investor, Inc. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the 
express permission from Institutional Investor, Inc. 
7 
 
investment-grade tranches, on the other hand, maintain tranche cash 
flows longer in Model 3, thus reducing the risk of investing in lower-
rated tranches.  
Overall, adding a second property cash flow trigger reduces loss 
frequency but increases loss severity at the whole-loan level. This shift 
from lower loss frequency to greater loss severity at the whole-loan 
level shifts the default risk in CMBS securities from the lower-rated 
tranches to the higher-rated tranches.9  
In Exhibit 4 we isolate the impact of balloon risk on the pricing 
of CMBS investments. Panel A presents total credit risk premiums 
(combined term default and balloon risk premiums) for CMBS tranches 
across the three default models, and Panel B presents the balloon risk 
premiums. The results reveal that the increase in whole-loan risk 
premiums is only 3 to 7 basis points when balloon risk is considered. 
Of the three models presented in Panel B, Model 3 has the highest 
balloon risk premiums. The higher balloon risk premiums for Model 3 
are expected, as weaker loans are able to make it to maturity without 
defaulting but at maturity are forced to extend as they are too weak to 
be refinanced.  
When we assess balloon risk premiums at the tranche level, the 
Model 3 balloon risk premiums are highest across all investment 
tranches except for the AAA tranche, which does not incur any credit 
risk premium across the three models. These results are important, as 
what is thought to be safer underwriting procedures (i.e., increasing 
property escrows) reduces default frequency, but increases loss 
severity and balloon risk premiums across all investment tranches. 
Furthermore, with a relatively small 7 basis-point increase in the 
whole-loan credit risk premium that is attributable to balloon risk, total 
risk premiums for the A, BBB, BB, and B tranches increase by 13 to 84 
basis points.  
Overall, we find that adding a second property income default 
trigger and including balloon risk marginally affects the pricing of 
whole loans but significantly affects the pricing of investment-grade 
CMBS tranches.  
 
CMBS Pricing Results—Comparative Analyses  
To better understand the impact of balloon risk on CMBS 
pricing, we also change the simulation parameters to reflect 
alternative states of the property and capital markets. Specifically, we 
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assess the effects on total credit risk and balloon risk of: 1) lower 
subordination levels; 2) rising mortgage interest rates; and 3) 
replacing amortizing loans with interest-only loans.  
In these comparative analyses we focus on Model 3 simulation 
results, assuming that rational borrowers would default only when the 
property equity position and property cash flow are both negative and 
when a debt service reserve account is depleted appears reasonable.10  
The base case credit risk analysis presented in Exhibit 4 
presumes average subordination levels for the period 1998-2004. Over 
this period of time, however, the subordination levels of CMES 
tranches have fallen substantially. The 2004 subordination levels are 
approximately one-half the 1998 levels and as of this writing are at all-
time lows (see Exhibit 1 for subordination levels in 1998, 2001, and 
2004).  
In Exhibit 5 we examine the impact of balloon risk on the pricing 
of CMBS tranches using 2004 subordination levels. Whole-loan credit 
risk premiums in Exhibits 4 and 5 are identical, as the CMES structure 
does not affect the characteristics of individual loans. That said, 
tranche credit risk premiums change dramatically. Total credit risk 
premiums extend well into the AA tranche, increasing from 16 to 81 
basis points. 
While the balloon risk premiums relative to the total credit risk 
premiums maintain approximately the same relationship (20%-25% of 
the total risk is balloon risk in the investment-grade tranches, and 
10%-15% of the total risk is balloon risk for non-investment-grade 
tranches), balloon risk premiums become two to five times higher for 
the AA, A, and BBB tranches than in the base case in Exhibit 4. As 
expected, the results show that lower subordination levels shift credit 
risk from lower-grade tranches to mid-level investment-grade 
tranches.  
In the next comparative analysis we simulate the impact of an 
upward sloping yield curve on CMES credit risk premiums. With 
interest rates at or near historically low levels, it is important to 
understand how rising interest rates might affect the valuation of 
CMBS tranches. The simulation results presented in Exhibit 6 employ a 
moderately upward-sloping (100 basis point increase from a two-year 
to a ten-year U.S. Treasury security) and a steeply upward-sloping 
yield curve (200 basis point increase from a two-year to a ten-year 
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U.S. Treasury security), which suggests higher interest rates in the 
future.  
The impact of rising interest rates on whole-loan risk premiums 
is modest and attributable mainly to higher balloon risk. Yet changes 
in CMBS risk premiums are dramatic, especially for a steeply upward-
sloping yield curve (Panel B in Exhibit 6). Investment-grade tranche 
total and balloon risk premiums (not including the AAA) almost double, 
while the impact on the non-investment-grade tranches of a steeply 
upward-sloping yield curve is more muted. Here again, the effect on 
total credit risk and balloon risk of higher interest rates in the future 
most significantly impacts the mid-range investment-grade tranches 
and does not as strongly impact the BB and B investment tranches.  
Interpreting the impact of interest-only loans on CMBS credit risk 
premiums is complicated. At the whole-loan level, as amortization 
reduces the loan balance over time, the possibility of default is 
reduced if LTV is the only default trigger. When property cash flow is 
also taken into account, interest-only loans may have lower default 
risk due to the higher initial DSC (note that at origination we use the 
same LTV for both amortizing and interest-only loans, so that the LTV 
is likely to limit the loan size and not the DSC).  
In our simulation analyses, commercial mortgages with a 
30year amortization schedule (the base case) have an initial DSC ratio 
of 1.40, while an interest-only loan with the same LTV has an initial 
DSC of 1.58. As a result, a mortgage pricing model that ignores the 
cash flow default condition likely overstates the probability of term 
default.  
While including the cash flow default trigger reduces the 
probability or the frequency of term default, loss severity increases 
dramatically for interest-only mortgages. The combination of lower 
default frequency and higher loss severity shifts part of the default risk 
from the lowest-rated subordinate tranches to investment-grade 
tranches, as lower-rated tranches maintain a positive cash flow from 
the investment for a longer period.  
In Exhibit 7, the simulation results reveal that term default risk 
premiums for non-investment-grade tranches either decline or stay the 
same; the risk premiums on all investment-grade tranches increase.  
As the term default probability declines, it becomes more likely 
that a loan reaching maturity will not meet contemporaneous 
refinancing requirements due to significantly weaker property or space 
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market fundamentals. As a result, the whole-loan balloon risk 
premiums rise, and the higher risk affects the investment-grade CMBS 
tranches disproportionately. Here again, term default frequency is 
reduced, while term default and balloon loss severity is increased.11  
 
Conclusion  
Using a contingent claims commercial mortgage pricing model in 
a multi tranche CMBS framework, we attempt to quantify the impact of 
balloon risk on CMBS investments. In the first stage of a two-stage 
analysis, we use a double-trigger default model (a property cash flow 
trigger and an asset value trigger) to project whole-loan cash flows. In 
the second stage, the whole-loan cash flows are pooled and allocated 
to the various CMBS tranches. The value and risk premiums of each 
tranche are then calculated using Monte Carlo simulation.  
We also complete a series of analyses under changing pool 
characteristics and market conditions, including lower subordination 
levels, interest-only loans, and higher mortgage interest rates.  
There are two significant findings in this research. First, balloon 
risk constitutes a relatively small portion of total credit risk at the 
whole-loan level (less than 10% of the total credit risk premium is 
attributable to balloon risk).Second, while balloon credit risk premiums 
are low at the whole-loan level (3-7 basis points), this risk 
disproportionately and significantly impacts all but the highest-rated 
investment-grade CMBS tranches.  
Balloon risk becomes a significant portion of the total credit risk 
premium for most investment-grade CMBS tranches, especially when 
more restrictive cash flow default triggers (such as higher property 
escrows) reduce the frequency of term default. As cash flow reserves 
prevent weaker properties from defaulting during the term of the loan, 
these properties become more vulnerable to balloon risk at maturity. 
The increase in loss severity from stringing along weak properties 
creeps into the pricing of the investment-grade tranches. Conversely, 
as non-investment grade CMBS tranches are kept in the deal with 
lower term default frequency, they receive interest payments longer in 
the face of deteriorating property fundamentals, and thus benefit from 
the reduction in loss frequency.  
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Appendix A: A Double-Trigger Default Model for Commercial 
Mortgages  
Most mortgage pricing studies assume monolithic default, i.e., the 
borrower defaults when the property value falls below the mortgage 
value. These default models have two major drawbacks. First, they 
ignore the borrower's cash flow position (i.e., a borrower would default 
even if the property net cash flow is sufficient to cover debt service). 
Second, they do not take into account default costs that are 
heterogeneous across borrowers.  
To address these issues, we develop a double-trigger mortgage 
pricing model by modifying the Riddiough-Thompson [1993] fuzzy 
boundary default function and adding a cash flow default trigger.  
Riddiough and Thompson [1993] introduce a commercial 
mortgage pricing model that endogenizes the effects of borrower 
default costs. The model's probability of default is a function of time to 
maturity and net equity in the property (illustrated in Exhibit A, where 
the net equity level is the ratio of property value over mortgage 
value).  
The plot shows that the borrower is more likely to default when 
the net equity level is lower and/or the loan approaches maturity. For 
various reasons, including borrower reputation concerns and tax 
liability effects, however, a negative equity position does not always 
trigger default.  
In our model, the borrower must incur a negative cash flow 
position in addition to an adverse net equity level to trigger default. 
Furthermore, a borrower is unlikely to default immediately when the 
DSC drops below 1.0. The borrower may fund a debt service shortfall 
through a property reserve account or other equity sources. Even 
when the borrower fails to make the payment, the master servicer 
advances the principal and interest payments if the shortfall is deemed 
temporary.  
As a result, in the whole-loan pricing model, we assume that the 
borrower will default only when the net equity level is below one and 
the cumulative cash flow shortfall over a 12-month period exceeds a 
certain threshold (for example, one month or three months' debt 
service).  
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Appendix B: State Variables in the Default Model  
Three state variables are specified in the contingent claims model: 
interest rate, property value, and payout rate. Interest rate variations 
are assumed to follow the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross [1985] mean-
revertingprocess:12 
 
dr = κ(θ- r)dt + σr√ ͞rdzr (B-1) 
 
where κ is the speed of reversion parameter, θ is the long-term 
reversion rate, σr√ ͞r is the standard deviation of changes in the current 
spot rate, and dzr is a standard Wiener process. A variety of shapes of 
the yield curve can be described by using a different initial interest 
rate, r0·.  
Property values are assumed to follow a lognormal diffusion 
process:  
 
dΡ = (αΡ - βΡ )Ρdt + σρΡdzρ (B-2) 
 
where Ρ is the property price, αΡ is the expected total return on the 
property, βΡ is the continuous property income payout rate, σρ is a 
volatility parameter of property returns, and dzρ is a standard Wiener 
process. To estimate the credit risk premium of commercial mortgages 
we apply the risk-neutral valuation principle, where the risk-neutral 
property price process is specified as:  
 
dΡ = (r - βΡ) Ρdt + σρΡdzρ  (B-3) 
 
and r is the riskless spot rate. It is assumed that there is an 
instantaneous correlation between changes in property prices and 
interest rates, ρΡr.  
The third stochastic variable in the mortgage pricing model is 
property cash flow. Monthly property cash flow is determined by 
multiplying the property value by the property income payout rate, 
which is modeled as a function of contemporaneous market interest 
rates. Since interest rate and payout rate are correlated, we specify 
the payout rate as a linear function of interest rates plus a random 
volatility measure:13  
βΡ = α + b x r + ε  (B-4) 
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where βΡ is the property income payout rate, r is the interest rate, α 
and b are estimated parameters, and ε is the residual. It is also 
assumed there is an autocorrelation term ρε between εt and εt-1.  
 
Endnotes  
The insights and comments of Martha Peyton and David Jacob 
have significantly improved this research. The Real Estate Research 
Institute (RERI) provided financial support to complete this paper. The 
authors thank them all.  
 
1. Most commercial mortgage pricing models in the academic literature use 
asset value as the sole default trigger, assuming that a borrower 
would default if and only if the property value is below the mortgage 
value (examples are Titman and Torous [1989], Kau et al. [1990], 
Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996], and Ciochetti and Yandell [1999]). 
Rational borrowers, however, would not default during the term of the 
loan if the property is generating sufficient cash flow to cover the debt 
service, even when the equity is negative. Therefore, adding a cash 
flow trigger as a necessary default condition that more accurately 
reflects borrower behavior. Jacob, Hong, and Lee [1999] consider 
property NOI as a default trigger, but they do not address balloon risk.  
Most pricing models also assume that the balloon balance is 
immediately paid off at maturity if default conditions are not met, 
ignoring the possibility that the borrower might not be able to pay off 
the mortgage in full.  
 
2. The backward numeric approach is preferred by many academic 
researchers as it explicitly measures the value of embedded default 
options in a mortgage. We use the Monte Carlo simulation approach 
for three primary reasons. First, we consider a double-trigger 
mortgage default model (i.e., one that considers both asset value and 
cash flow as default triggers), where three state variables are used to 
price a single mortgage: property cash flows, mortgage interest rates, 
and property values. When the model is applied to value a mortgage 
pool with N loans, (2N + 1) state variables are incorporated. This type 
of valuation problem becomes intractable using a backward numerical 
method, as computation time increases exponentially with the number 
of state variables. Monte Carlo simulation permits the use of a large 
number of state variables and provides more flexibility to reflect 
changing market conditions.  
A second general criticism of mortgage and CMBS pricing 
models is their inability to capture real estate cycles and differences 
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across markets and property types (see Hudson- Wilson and 
Pappadopoulos [1999]). We find this a valid criticism and have 
incorporated these factors into the stochastic property valuation 
process and the income correlation between individual properties.  
The third limitation is that the backward numeric method 
requires the specification of terminal conditions at maturity, and then 
works backward in time to derive the mortgage value. If we take into 
account the possibility of loan extension, terminal conditions cannot be 
specified at the originally scheduled maturity. As a result, the forward-
looking Monte Carlo approach provides the only reasonable means of 
valuing multitranche CMBS using a double-trigger term default and 
balloon risk model.  
 
3. In the double-trigger default model, the borrower must incur a negative 
cash flow position and a negative net equity level to consider default. 
In other words, a DSC of less than and an LTV of higher than 1.0 are 
both necessary conditions for default.  
 
4. While a range of mortgage extension fees and rules can be imposed that 
vary widely among the different mortgage loan agreements, our 
extension parameters are reflective of what many special servicers 
impose on mortgage loans that are extended beyond the mortgage 
maturity date (see Jacob and Fastovsky [1999]).  
5. Commercial mortgage pricing studies have generally presumed non-
callable mortgages (see Titman and Torous [1989], Riddiough and 
Thompson [1993], and Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996]). Most 
commercial mortgages have lockout periods and strict prepayment 
penalties in the form of defeasance and yield maintenance prepayment 
penalties.  
Parameters related to the stochastic processes of the three 
state variables include: a flat yield curve (r0 = 7.5%, κ = 25%, θ = 
7.5%, and σr= 8.0%), a property return volatility of 15%, a zero 
correlation between property value and interest rate, and an initial 
property payout rate of 7.8%. These assumptions are consistent with 
Esaki, L'Heureux, and Snyderman [1999] and Esaki and Goldman 
[2004].  
6. For example, see the "Fitch Commercial Mortgage Presale Report" [2003]. 
Its summary statistics reveal that 82% of all mortgages in the pool 
have capital reserve requirements and 87% have upfront or ongoing 
expense reserve requirements.  
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7. CMBS subordination levels have fallen dramatically over the 1998-2004 
period. As 2004 subordination levels were at all-time lows, we feel an 
average subordination level over a relevant analysis period may be 
more reflective of the market and allow us to later test the impact of 
changing subordination levels on the pricing of CMBS investment 
tranches.  
8. Jacob and Fastovsky [1999] reveal similar findings for trouble loans that 
are modified.  
9. Interest-only strips (IOs) in CMBS are often assigned AAA ratings. The 
unique characteristics of this type of investment make it inappropriate 
to consider the credit risk of an 10 equivalent to that of an AAA-rated 
CMBS investment tranche. We focus on the impact of balloon risk on 
bond classes with non-notional principal balances.  
10. For example, with a 6.50% mortgage constant, the cost of keeping the 
option open is 1.625% of the loan amount at origination in the three-
month reserve scenario.  
11. We have completed additional simulation analyses; examples include 
changing underwriting standards at the time of refinancing, using 
different cash flow payout rates, and changing the borrower's ability to 
self-fund the balloon payment shortfall. In all cases where balloon risk 
increases at the whole-loan level, investment-grade CMBS tranches 
are disproportionately affected. The patterns are consistent with those 
scenarios presented in the comparative analyses section; investors in 
mid-level investment-grade tranches bear most of the increase in 
balloon risk.  
 
12. Levin [2004, p. 77] compares term structure models and finds that "any 
volatility model between the normal one and the square root seems to 
be a decent choice." An example of the square root models, the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model is the most commonly used in the mortgage 
pricing literature.  
13. Data on commercial property income payout rates are not available, so 
we estimate the relationship between payout rates and interest rates 
using property capitalization rates as a proxy. A regression of 
capitalization rates on mortgage contract rates is estimated using ACLI 
data. A similar approach is taken by Goldberg and Capone [2002].  
 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2005): pg. 114-123. DOI. This article is © Institutional 
Investor, Inc. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional 
Investor, Inc. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the 
express permission from Institutional Investor, Inc. 
16 
 
References  
Childs, P.D., S.H. Ott, and T.J. Riddiough. "The Pricing of Multiclass 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 31 (1996), pp. 581-603.  
Ciochetti, B.A., and K.D. Vandell. "The Performance of Commercial 
Mortgages." Real Estate Economics, 27 (1999), pp. 27-61.  
"CMBS Market Watch Weekly." Credit Suisse First Boston, February 18, 2005.  
"Commercial Mortgage Presale Report: GE Capital Commercial Mortgage 
Corporation." Fitch Ratings. Series 2003-C2, 2003.  
Cox, J.C., J.E. Ingersoll, and S.A. Ross. "A Theory of the Term Structure of 
Interest Rates." Econometrica, 53 (1985), pp. 385-407.  
Esaki, H., and M. Goldman. "Commercial Mortgage Defaults: 30 Years of 
History." CMBS Perspectives, September 17, 2004, pp.3-9.  
Esaki, H., S. L'Heureux, and M. Snyderman. "Commercial Mortgage Defaults: 
An Update." Real Estate Finance, 16 (1999), pp. 80-86.  
Goldberg, L., and C.A. Capone. "A Dynamic Double-Trigger Model of 
Multifamily Mortgage Default." Real Estate Economics, 30 (2002), pp. 
85-113.  
Hudson-Wilson, S., and G.J. Pappadopoulos. "CMBS and the Real Estate 
Cycle." The Journal of Portfolio Management, 25 (1999), pp. 105-111.  
Jacob, D.P., and P. Fastovsky. "Understanding and Managing the Balloon Risk 
of Commercial Mortgages in CMBS." In F.J. Fabozzi and D.P.Jacob, 
eds., The Handbook of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2nd 
ed. New Hope, PA: Frank J. Fabozzi Associates, 1999, pp. 275-285. 
Jacob, D.P., T. Hong, and L.H. Lee. "An Options Approach to Commercial 
Mortgages and CMBS Valuation and Risk Analysis." In F.J. Fabozzi and 
D.P.Jacob, eds., The Handbook of Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, 2nd ed. New Hope, P A: Frank J. Fabozzi Associates, 1999, 
pp. 317-346.  
Kau, J.B., D.C. Keenan, W.S. Muller, and J.F. Epperson. "Pricing Commercial 
Mortgages and Their Mortgage-Backed Securities." Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics, 3 (1990), pp. 333-356.  
Lehman, R., M.S. Freydberg, and J. Tcherkassova. "Extension Risk Has Grown 
But Quantifying it Remains Elusive." Merrill Lynch CMBS Weekly, July 
28, 2004, pp. 2-4.  
Levin, A. "Interest Rate Model Selection." The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 30 (2004), pp. 74-86.  
Riddiough, T.J., and H.E. Thompson. "Commercial Mortgage Pricing with 
Unobservable Borrower Default Costs." Journal of the American Real 
Estate and Urban Economics Association, 21 (1993), pp. 265-291.  
Titman, S., and W. Torous. "Valuing Commercial Mortgages: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Contingent-Claims Approach to Pricing Risky 
Debt." Journal of Finance, 44 (1989), pp. 345-373.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2005): pg. 114-123. DOI. This article is © Institutional 
Investor, Inc. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional 
Investor, Inc. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the 
express permission from Institutional Investor, Inc. 
17 
 
Tu, C., and M. Eppli. "Term Default, Balloon Risk, and Credit Risk in 
Commercial Mortgages." The Journal of Fixed Income, 13 (2003), pp. 
42-52. 
 
Exhibits  
 
Exhibit 1: Subordination Levels of CMBS Tranches  
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Exhibit 2: Interest-Only Loans in Conduit CMBS  
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Exhibit 3: Term Default Risk Premiums of CMBS Tranches (in basis 
points)* 
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Exhibit 4: Credit Risk Premiums of CMBS Tranches (including balloon 
risk)—Base Case 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Impact of Lower Subordination Levels on CMBS Tranches 
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Exhibit 6: Impact of Different Shapes of Yield Curve on CMBS 
Tranches 
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Exhibit 7: Impact of Interest-Only Loans on CMBS Tranches 
 
 
Exhibit A: Default Probability Functions  
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